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THE (LIMITED) ROLE OF REGULATORY
HARMONIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL
GOODS AND SERVICES MARKETS
Alan 0. Sykes*
ABSTRACT
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and its agreements relating to
technical barriers, much attention has been devoted to the possibility of har-
monizing international regulatory policies to reduce the impediments to com-
merce that result from regulatory heterogeneity. This paper argues that, as
a normative matter, harmonization is inferior to a legal system that tolerates
regulatory differences subject to legal constraints, and that relies on mutual
recognition where appropriate (the exception to this claim being matters of
technical compatibility between products). Related, as a positive matter, har-
monization will often lack any political constituency and thus instances of
true harmonization will be rare. To develop these claims, the paper carefully
elucidates the unnecessary trade impediments that may result from regula-
tory heterogeneity, and shows how measures short of harmonization can usu-
ally address them adequately.
INTRODUCTION
The traditional instruments of protectionism (tariffs and quotas) are increas-
ingly unimportant in the international economy, owing to the success of trade
liberalizing accords such as the WTO/GATT, NAFTA and the Treaty of Rome.
The attention of the trading community has accordingly shifted to various 'non-
tariff barriers' to trade, which remain important in many goods sectors and lie
at the heart of impediments to international trade in services. Among the most
important sources of such impediments is variation among nations in their
domestic regulatory policies - what I term 'regulatory heterogeneity'.'
* Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, The University
of Chicago, I I 1 East 60th Street, Chicago, IL 6063, USA. I have benefited from comments at a
Columbia University conference on trade issues for the next century, and from members of the
editorial board.
Throughout this paper, I use the term 'regulation' as it is used in the WTO/GATT agreements,
to refer to policies promulgated by governments with which compliance is mandatory. 'Standards',
with which compliance is voluntary and which may result from either government or private sec-
tor activity, are to be distinguished. Nevertheless, much of what I have to say about regulations
can also be applied to standards issues. For a more complete discussion, see A. 0. Sykes, Product
Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods Markets (Brookings 1995).
0 Oxford University Press
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Regulatory heterogeneity in the international economy can increase the
costs of exporting firms and impede trade in both goods and services. If
these trade impediments can be reduced without violence to legitimate reg-
ulatory objectives, global economic welfare will increase just as it does when
tariffs, quotas and other traditional trade restrictions are eliminated. 2 Yet
national regulators are often reluctant on their own to make allowances for
the trade impact of their policies, sometimes for high-minded reasons and
other times for not so high-minded reasons. The inevitable result has been
pressure for international accords to address the trade effects of regulatory
heterogeneity, and many such accords now exist.
The possible international responses to regulatory heterogeneity may be
divided into three generic categories. First, the trading community can allow
national (and sometimes sub-national) regulators to regulate all goods or ser-
vices sold within their jurisdiction, tolerating a considerable degree of het-
erogeneity in the resulting policies, while concurrently imposing a number
of constraints on those policies to reduce their adverse impact on trade.
These constraints can include notice and transparency requirements, non-
discrimination requirements, least restrictive means requirements, and the
like. This type of response I will term 'policed decentralization'.
Second, the international community can exempt imported goods and ser-
vices from the regulations of the importing nation while requiring exporters
to comply with applicable regulations in their home country. This approach
also tolerates the persistence of regulatory heterogeneity across nations, and
reduces its trade impact by ensuring that each firm need comply with only
one set of regulations (those of its home country) regardless of the number
of markets in which it sells. Such a policy is known as 'mutual recognition'.
Third, the international community can undertake to address regulatory
heterogeneity by negotiating an end to it - a compact requiring all nations
to follow the same substantive regulations. And once differences in national
regulatory policies are eliminated, the trade effects of those differences nec-
essarily evaporate as mutual recognition can be extended as a matter of
course. This last option I will term 'regulatory harmonization'.
As a terminological preliminary, the use of the term 'harmonization' in this
paper does not fully accord with its meaning elsewhere. For example, David
Leebron has defined harmonization as 'making the regulatory requirements
or governmental policies of different jurisdictions identical, or at least more
similar'.3 This definition is much too broad for my purposes, for all three
2 Indeed, the elimination of regulatory barriers to trade may often generate greater welfare gains than
the elimination of other trade barriers. A. 0. Sykes, 'Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of
International Trade', Univ. of Chicago L Rev. (forthcoming).
3 D. Leebron, 'Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims', in J. Bhagwati
and R. Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol. 1 (MIT
Press: 1996), 41-117, at 43. Here, 'harmonization' is used in a strong sense to capture international
agreements that would homogenize regulatory policy and largely eliminate national differences.
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options that I address - policed decentralization, mutual recognition, and
harmonization as here defined - have the ability to make regulatory policies
'more similar' in certain respects. My enterprise involves a careful effort to
distinguish these techniques, and cannot tolerate confusion among them.
Likewise, the focus here is on the kinds of regulatory heterogeneity that
create actual or potential impediments to trade at the border. By an 'imped-
iment', I mean a measure that increases the costs to foreign firms of serv-
ing a particular export market, and wish to distinguish regulatory differences
across nations that may raise a policy concern of a different sort. In partic-
ular, it is sometimes asserted that differences in environmental policies across
nations, or in labor standards, or in competition policy, give certain firms
an unfair cost advantage in trade at the expense of broader social welfare or
social justice concerns. Regardless of the merits of such claims, the pur-
portedly objectionable trade impact of such differences lies not in the com-
pliance burden imposed on foreign firms, but on the cost advantage conferred
on domestic firms by regulatory laxity in some nations. The issues there are
different, as they involve concerns about cross-boundary externalities, 'races
to the bottom', and so forth, which I do not intend to address. 4
In many ways, regulatory harmonization might seem the most straight-
forward solution to the trade impediments created by regulatory hetero-
geneity. Unlike policed decentralization, harmonization altogether eliminates
the need for firms to comply with different sets of regulations, and the asso-
ciated costs. Unlike mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization assures all
importing nations that goods and services produced abroad meet their mutu-
ally agreed upon regulatory objectives.
Interestingly, however, regulatory harmonization is infrequent at the global
level. This paper asks why, and further inquires whether the absence of
greater regulatory harmonization. is unfortunate.
Because I am posing these questions at a high level of generality without
limitation to particular goods or service sectors, the analysis is subject to
inevitable caveats and exceptions. But the general lessons are clear. From a
normative standpoint - that is, from the standpoint of someone concerned
about the maximization of global economic welfare - it is very much the
exceptional case in which international regulatory harmonization is the best
option. Most importantly, it is often socially productive to respect differences
in national preferences regarding regulatory policy. Where those preferences
4 Much of the literature on these issues nevertheless reaches a conclusion similar to mine - that
international harmonization is neither necessary nor desirable to avoid undue laxity in environ-
mental, labor or competition policies. See generally J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec (eds), Fair Trade
and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade?, Vols. 1-2 (MIT Press: 1996), especially the
papers by Bhagwati and Srinivasan, and by Brown, Deardorff, and Stern; IL L. Revesz,
'Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation', 67 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1210 (1992). For a contrary view, see D. C. Esty,
'Revitalizing Environmental Federalism', 95 Mich. L Rev. 570 (1996).
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reflect differences in risk tolerance, differences in incomes, or differences in
geography, for example, regulatory heterogeneity is desirable, other things
being equal. Further, once put in place, internationally harmonized regula-
tions may be more difficult to adapt to new information and technologies.
Regulatory heterogeneity will exist in an ideal world, therefore, to a consider-
able extent.
But heterogeneity would nonetheless be limited in an ideal world to those
differences in regulatory policy that reflect 'legitimate' differences among
nations. Regulatory heterogeneity driven by protectionist capture, by bureau-
cratic indifference or by information failures would not survive, and the trade
effects of 'legitimate' regulatory heterogeneity would be minimized. Further,
there may arise circumstances in which even 'legitimate' heterogeneity is not
worth its cost because its benefits are small and its trade effects great.
It is my thesis that sound principles of policed decentralization, coupled
with appropriate agreements to afford mutual recognition, can achieve these
ideals; harmonization is not needed and is often undesirable. This norma-
tive claim provides the germ of a positive claim as well. In particular, although
I will stipulate that international political equilibria rarely achieve the nor-
mative ideal, the absence of any compelling normative case for harmoniza-
tion provides some basis to doubt that it will be pursued very often, a notion
seemingly borne out by experience.
Section 1 elaborates in some detail the ways that regulatory heterogeneity
can impede trade in goods and services. Section 2 then considers the causes
of regulatory heterogeneity, which bear importantly on whether the interna-
tional community should undertake to do anything about it. Section 3 dis-
cusses the extent to which policed decentralization and mutual recognition
will eliminate the trade 'impediments' that result from regulatory hetero-
geneity, and identifies the types of impediments that will remain. Section 4
inquires whether regulatory harmonization is a desirable way to address these
remaining impediments, and whether it is likely to occur.
I. THE COSTS OF REGULATORY HETEROGENEITY
At some level it is obvious that the need to comply with different sets of
regulations in different markets can increase the costs of doing business.
Nevertheless, it is useful to articulate the ways in which regulatory hetero-
geneity can increase costs, as the various kinds of increased costs require
different strategies for remediation.
Inherent differences in compliance costs due to differences in
regulatory stringency
Trivially, some regulations are more costly to comply with than others, even
when they are aimed at the same general regulatory objective. The cost per
vehicle to reduce auto emissions, for example, will increase as the permissible
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level of emissions declines. The opportunity costs of the funds required to
be held on reserve by commercial banks will rise as the fractional reserve
requirement increases.
These types of costs are not really costs of regulatory heterogeneity per
se, but result from the fact that some regulations are more stringent than
others. Were heterogeneity in this sense to be eliminated, the total costs to
firms of regulatory compliance might increase, decrease, or remain the same
depending on whether the international community converged on more strin-
gent, less stringent, or intermediate levels of regulatory requirements.
Likewise, although firms may lament the fact that some of their markets
require them to comply with more stringent regulatory requirements than
others, differences in the stringency of regulations do not necessarily dis-
advantage foreign firms relative to domestic firms. It is only when compli-
ance costs per unit of output are higher for foreign firms than for domestic
firms that the 'playing field' tilts toward domestic producers.
This last observation suggests a division of cases that is quite important.
At times, regulatory heterogeneity affects foreign and domestic suppliers
equally, imposing greater or lesser compliance costs in accordance with the
stringency of the regulation without regard to the origin of the regulated
good or service. In this group of cases, regulatory heterogeneity is not really
a 'trade problem' at all. To be sure, the wisdom of regulatory policy in a
given country may be hotly debatable, and it may be that one or more coun-
tries is over-regulating and imposing socially unproductive costs on all firms
(and consumers) in its market. But if foreign firms face the same compli-
ance costs as domestic firms, comparative advantage will dictate who suc-
ceeds in the market and who fails. Likewise, trade accords are pertinent only
to the degree that they may provide a forum for persuading nations that
over-regulate to change their ways.
In other cases, however, regulatory differences may impose greater costs
on foreign firms than on domestic firms. It is here that trade is more directly
implicated. In the remainder of this section, therefore, I focus on costs of
regulatory heterogeneity that tend to fall more heavily on foreign suppliers.
Added requirements for foreign firms
Obviously, regulations that apply exclusively to foreign firms will raise their
costs relative to the costs of their domestic competitors. Where the regula-
tory regime is discriminatory in a way that disfavors foreign suppliers, there-
fore, trade is directly affected just as if the importing nation had employed
a tariff or some other conventional protectionist instrument.
Costs of 'surprise'
Often, firms must make investments in new capital or retooling to comply
with new regulations. Even where these costs are the same for domestic and
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foreign firms, greater advance notice of impending regulatory changes can
confer a competitive advantage. Firms with more advance notice may be able
to serve the regulated market sooner than others, affording them at least a
transitory period of exclusive access. And, where economies of scale are
important, this first mover advantage may translate into a long-term com-
petitive edge. Because domestic firms tend to be better informed about and
more involved in their own political systems than foreign firms, the costs of
regulatory 'surprise' seem likely to fall more heavily on foreign firms.
Redundancy costs
Putting discrimination and surprise in regulatory policy to one side, differ-
ent nations may nevertheless pursue their regulatory objectives in different
ways. Country A may ensure that meats are safe for consumption by test-
ing for bacteria and other residues after animals are slaughtered. Country B
may pursue the same objective by requiring certain procedures to be fol-
lowed during the slaughtering process. As another example, country A may
undertake to ensure the solvency of its banks by requiring considerable levels
of capital investment to cushion against portfolio losses (capital adequacy
regulation). Country B may pursue the same objective by regulating the risk-
iness of its banks' portfolios directly.
When firms do business in different countries, each country may require
them to obey its regulations without modification. As a result, firms can
become subject to redundant regulatory requirements that increase their costs
of doing business without being necessary to the attainment of regulatory
objectives. To return to the examples above, meat packing plants in coun-
try A may become subject to the slaughtering requirements of country B,
even though post-slaughter testing by country A is enough to ensure the
wholesomeness of the meat. The bank of country A that opens a branch in
country B may become subject to the asset portfolio regulations of country
B, even though the capital adequacy regulations of country A are enough to
eliminate the solvency risks that concern the regulators of country B.
These unnecessary costs will not afflict firms that serve only one market,
and thus tend to fall exclusively on firms that engage in international trade.
Thus, regulatory redundancy tilts the 'playing field' and is properly consid-
ered a trade issue.
Loss of scale economies and input economies
Related, firms that become subject to different regulations may elect to sever
their operations into separate components that need only comply with the
regulations in one market. They will do so when this option is cheaper than
incurring the costs of redundancy.
In some cases, this response to differences in regulatory approach across
countries will result in little added cost. If the independent operations for
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each market are large enough to exhaust all pertinent scale economies, and
if they can purchase their inputs as cheaply as operations situated elsewhere,
then they can deliver goods or services just as cheaply as consolidated oper-
ations. The different regulatory approaches may entail different costs of com-
pliance, of course, so that firms in high compliance cost countries will have
to charge more for their output, but again there need be no trade issue -
domestic firms and foreign firms that serve each nation can be on an equal
competitive footing.
But it is clear that establishing separate operations to serve different
national markets will often increase unit costs considerably, even putting
aside differences in regulatory compliance costs. Separate facilities may for-
feit any number of scale economies in manufacturing, management, mar-
keting, risk diversification, and the like. Additionally, when firms can only
avoid redundant regulations by establishing operations within the territories
of each regulatory jurisdiction, they may be forced to pay considerably higher
prices for some of their inputs. Whether the input is a live animal, a trained
clerk, a data processing service, or something else, geographic constraints on
production will prevent firms from locating themselves to take advantage of
the most favorable input prices.
These increased costs that arise when firms must sever their operations to
avoid regulatory redundancy also raise trade issues. Where scale economies
are important, foreign firms may not be able to enter a market without doing
so on a large scale, an option that may be quite unattractive due to its riski-
ness or to the existence of substantial capacity in that market already. And if
avoiding regulatory redundancy requires firms to scatter their operations geo-
graphically, they may be at a disadvantage in securing their inputs.
Information costs
Putting aside the costs of regulatory redundancy or of establishing separate
operations to avoid it, firms invariably must incur costs to learn about the
regulatory systems in the various markets that they serve. They may need to
translate regulations into another language, to hire lawyers to explain the
regulations to them, and so forth. They may even incur substantial costs try-
ing to identify who is in charge of regulating and where their regulations
may be found in an accessible form.
These costs tend to be greater for foreign firms than for domestic firms
because of language barriers that afflict foreign firms and because foreign
firms may tend to be unfamiliar with the political and bureaucratic system
abroad. Further, because the costs of learning about regulations may be
largely independent of each firm's output, they tend to add more to the unit
costs of firms that have a smaller market presence. This fact also tends to
disadvantage foreign firms relative to domestic firms when the foreign firms
have only a small presence in a given market.
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Conformity assessment costs
It is at times useful to distinguish the costs of complying with regulations
from the costs of proving compliance to the satisfaction of regulators. The
meat packing plant that sells to multiple markets may become subject to
multiple inspections and 'added paperwork. The bank that serves multiple
markets may become subject to additional bank examinations and audit
requirements. These costs of demonstrating compliance with regulations are
commonly known as costs of 'conformity assessment'.
like the costs of learning about regulations, the costs of demonstrating
conformity may be higher for foreign firms because of language barriers or
because the required conformity assessment procedure necessitates dealings
with an unfamiliar entity (such as a testing laboratory) in a foreign country.
The unit costs of conformity assessment may also be greater for firms with
a smaller presence in a market - where conformity assessment requires that
a certain number of units of output be inspected, for example, or that a cer-
tain type of audit be performed, firms with larger output can spread the costs
over a larger base, giving large domestic firms an advantage over smaller
foreign firms.
Conformity assessment costs may disadvantage foreign firms for yet
another reason. Just as substantive regulations may be redundant, so may
the testing and certification necessary for conformity assessment. Suppose,
for example, that country A and country B have identical regulations respect-
ing the procedures by which animals are slaughtered. If both countries insist
on inspections by their own inspectors, conformity assessment costs for a
firm that serves both markets will be roughly twice those of a firm that serves
only one, notwithstanding the absence of any substantive difference in the
regulations, and notwithstanding the fact that a single inspection process
may suffice to ensure compliance with regulations in both countries. A bank
that must incur the cost of two separate audits might confront the same
problem.
To conclude this section, I wish to be clear that when I use the term 'cost'
above I do not mean to equate it with 'inefficiency', nor do I mean to sug-
gest that any cost which burdens foreign firms more heavily is undesirable
while any cost which burdens domestic and foreign firms equally is accept-
able. As noted, regulations may be wasteful or foolish even if they are neutral
in a trade sense. Conversely, regulatory heterogeneity may be defensible even
when it is not neutral in a trade sense - the relatively greater burden on
foreign firms may be unavoidable if some legitimate regulatory objective
is to be attained. But as will become clear below, there are many ways in
which the trade impact of regulatory heterogeneity can be reduced without
sacrificing legitimate regulatory goals, and without the need for nations to
reach agreement on precisely which set of substantive regulations is ideal.
Put more strongly, the international community can eliminate most of the
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demonstrably undesirable trade impact of regulatory heterogeneity with
measures that fall short of regulatory harmonization. The remaining costs of
heterogeneity will then inhere in the decision by some nations to regulate
more stringently. Before turning to that discussion, however, it is important
to consider the reasons why regulatory heterogeneity may emerge in the first
instance.
2. THE CAUSES OF REGULATORY HETEROGENEITY AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
Just as the different costs of regulatory heterogeneity will suggest different
possibilities for remediation, so do the different reasons for regulatory
heterogeneity suggest different responses by the trading community. Put
simply, there is good heterogeneity and bad heterogeneity - the principal
line is between heterogeneity that reflects honest differences in tastes and
incomes and a few related factors, and heterogeneity that reflects indiffer-
ence, inadequate information or capture. Heterogeneity that arises for the
first set of reasons is not only acceptable but probably desirable as a policy
matter. Heterogeneity driven by the second set of considerations is undesir-
able, and would be eliminated (or its effects eliminated) in an ideal world.
Citizen tastes, incomes, and related factors
The cultures and experiences of citizens in different societies will often lead
them to assign different priorities to particular types of regulation. A nation
in which insurance company failures or bank runs have been a problem may
exhibit a stronger demand for prudential regulation of these financial insti-
tutions. A nation that has experienced a safety-related tragedy may exhibit
greater demand for health and safety regulation of a particular sort. Likewise,
national constituencies may differ in the extent to which they 'trust' mar-
kets to function well, and in their attitude toward government - those less
comfortable with markets and more sanguine about government interven-
tion may tend to prefer regulatory measures more often.
Related, average income and the income distribution will have consider-
able influence on citizen demand for regulation. Consider, for example, reg-
ulations relating to the safety or quality of products. Most forms of safety
and quality regulation increase the costs to consumers of the regulated good.
The willingness of consumers to bear these additional costs will tend to rise
as per capita income rises, 'because safety and quality are typically 'normal
goods'. That is, individuals with higher incomes prefer to spend more on
safety and quality. More generally, for all varieties of regulations that increase
the costs of goods or services for the ostensible purpose of protecting con-
sumers or the broader society from some perceived risk, we might expect
that wealthier countries will prefer a greater level of regulation, other things
being equal.
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The desire of the citizenry for regulation will also be influenced in many
cases by the income distribution. To take a simple example, consider two
democratic societies in which majority approval or disapproval of regulatory
proposals turns on the preferences of the 'median voter'. Both have the same
per capita income, but one has an egalitarian income distribution, and the
other a skewed distribution with a minority of wealthy individuals and a
majority of less affluent individuals. By the hypothesis that health and safety
regulations are 'normal goods', the median voter will desire a greater level
of this type of regulation in the first society than in the second.
Tastes -and incomes are not the only factors that drive reasonable differ-
ences in regulatory policy. A jurisdiction in an area prone to earthquakes or
hurricanes may well adopt special building codes as a result. The climate
and geography around Los Angeles warrants extra efforts to control auto
emissions. Other examples can no doubt be offered.
When regulatory heterogeneity across nations responds sensibly to these
differences across jurisdictions, there can be little quarrel with it, even if it
disadvantages certain foreign firms. In many instances, heterogeneity arising
for these reasons can be defended on efficiency grounds; in other cases,
democratic legitimacy would appear to justify it, even if a compelling effi-
ciency case cannot be made. Either way, there is little argument for break-
ing down regulatory differences across countries under these circumstances
or for labeling those differences a 'trade problem'.
Equally clearly, however, not all manifestations of regulatory heterogeneity
can be justified by taste and income differences, and even when they can, it
may be possible to reduce the trade effects by structuring regulation in cer-
tain ways. It is thus important to consider the other reasons why regulatory
differences may arise.
Chance and information differences
The evolution of regulatory policy across jurisdictions may to a considerable
degree result from chance factors. To illustrate, the adoption of either the
metric or imperial system of measurement was once a matter of royal decree.
The differences between the systems have no apparent functional rationale,
and cannot be said to respond to differences in tastes or preferences across
nations. Rather, they seem to be a by-product of the development of in-
dependent and largely arbitrary commercial standards in once-isolated mar-
kets. The commercial effects of these arbitrary differences still persist in a
variety of regulatory settings (building codes to name just one). 5
Plausibly, many other international differences in regulatory policy have a
s A. Krueger has recently suggested that the continued adherence of the United States to the impe-
rial system of measurement is the most important standards-related problem for American com-
petitiveness. See A. Krueger, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Technology and
Competitiveness, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology (4
March 1992), 102 Congress, 2nd session.
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similar genesis. They respond not to any difference in the desires of the cit-
izenry or of narrower political constituencies, but to the whim of the bureau-
crat who drafts the regulation, or perhaps to an arbitrary convergence of
local practices that might well have converged on a different focal point.
Related, regulatory differences may reflect the limited information of
policy makers at the time that regulations are formulated. Regulators may
simply be unaware of all of the technologies capable of performing a par-
ticular regulatory task or of achieving a particular regulatory objective.
Likewise, they may have only a subset of the pertinent scientific evidence
available on various risks that they seek to control.
Where regulatory heterogeneity is the product of chance factors or of the
limited information available to regulators, it is unlikely to serve any useful
function, and its attendant burdens on trade are likely to be counter-
productive. If the particular details of regulation are a result of chance, alter-
native regulations can often achieve regulatory objectives just as effectively.
If regulations are based on limited information, they may prove outmoded
or unnecessary altogether when viewed in light of more complete informa-
tion. In each case, a move toward greater uniformity of regulation, or at least
toward lessening the trade effects of heterogeneity, will benefit the trading
community as a whole.
Whether such moves will occur, of course, will depend on political factors.
Firms that have sunk costs in complying with existing regulations will resist
any changes that would wipe out their sunk investments, and may even see
opportunities to disadvantage rivals by perpetuating regulations that are espe-
cially costly to them. This observation leads to the next set of reasons for reg-
ulatory heterogeneity, and the most malign - those relating to capture.
Capture
Much of the modem economic literature on regulation emphasizes how it
serves the interests of the regulated industries or other narrow constitu-
encies, rather than the interests of society at large. 6 The essential idea, bor-
rowed from the general lessons of public choice, is that well-organized and
cohesive interest groups can influence the political process to promote their
interests at the expense of poorly organized groups or groups whose mem-
bers have divergent interests. Regulated industries, and sometimes workers
in those industries, often have homogeneous interests on matters subject to
regulation, and have a sufficient stake in them to become organized to in-
fluence the political process. The result is that regulation, notwithstanding
the high-minded rhetoric that may accompany it, may serve primarily to
transfer economic surplus to the constituency that demands it, often the reg-
ulated industry itself.
6 See, e.g., S. Peltzman, 'Toward a More General Theory of Regulation', 19 J. L. & Econ. 211
(1976); G. Stigler, 'The Theory of Economic Regulation', 2 Bell J. Econ. & Man. Sci. 3 (1971).
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Such capture can readily produce regulatory heterogeneity and associated
impediments to international trade. Indeed, the creation of those impedi-
ments may be the primary goal of the constituency that favors regulation.
The easiest way to disadvantage potential competitors from other juris-
dictions is to create regulatory burdens that apply exclusively to them. A
meat sanitation regulation might provide for annual inspection of domestic
packing plants, for example, but require that meat from other jurisdictions
be tested batch-by-batch for residues. Even more transparently, meat from
other jurisdictions might be subject to stringent residue requirements that
do not apply at all to locally produced meat.
But discriminatory policies are by no means the only way to disadvan-
tage potential competitors. To give some examples in the financial services
area, regulations may require that banks, insurance companies and the like
establish a substantial physical presence within the regulatory jurisdiction,
ostensibly to ensure that regulatory oversight can be conducted effectively
and to 'bond' the regulated firms to obey pertinent regulations out of fear
for losing their sunk investments. Or regulators may restrict in various ways
the right to open new branch offices, purportedly to prevent 'ruinous
competition' with existing firms. These regulations may nominally apply to
all firms equally. Yet, all of these restrictions can also be seen as entry
barriers, designed to insulate existing firms from new competition by
making it difficult or at least more expensive for new firms to begin or
expand operations. The same may be said of regulations that require firms
to make their activities within a jurisdiction financially independent of their
activities elsewhere, thereby depriving them of scale economies or input
economies.
Nominally non-discriminatory regulations can also be constructed to favor
domestic firms by requiring the use of technologies, processes or ingredients
in which domestic firms have a proprietary interest, or at least in which they
have a cost advantage. The same strategy can be applied to favor domestic
firms in the conformity assessment process. Thus, automobiles might be
required to use a particular proprietary pollution control technology, or to
incorporate some particular safety device that is not in use in any other coun-
try. 'Pasta' might be required to contain certain ingredients in certain pro-
portions, favoring ingredients that are cheap and abundant locally.
Conformity assessment might be required to be conducted at a particular
domestic testing laboratory, where goods from particular firms are handled
more expeditiously. Innumerable other illustrations might be offered.
The use of regulations and associated conformity assessment requirements
for the purpose of disadvantaging rival firms is obviously unproductive from
a societal standpoint, much like the use of traditional instruments of
protection such as tariffs. Indeed, regulatory barriers may be even more
pernicious, as they may cause firms to waste resources on uneconomic
methods of production to comply with regulations - tariffs, at least, leave all
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firms free to minimize costs as best they can. Thus, the international com-
munity would do well to ferret out this behavior as best it can and elimi-
nate it.
Equally clearly, however, this type of unproductive activity may be dif-
ficult to eliminate as a political matter. By hypothesis, it results from the
capture of the regulatory process by well-organized interest groups, and
those groups may be expected to resist pressures for change fully as
vigorously as they pressed for favorable regulation in the first instance.
Indeed, resistance to change may be even more vigorous where change
would threaten the returns to sunk investments. But it is important not to
be too pessimistic. Tariffs and quotas are also the product of capture (import-
competing producer interest groups prevailing over consuming interest
groups), and the world has seen much progress toward their elimination as
noted earlier. Evidently, exporter interest groups favoring the liberalization
of markets abroad are often able to persuade their national officials to sac-
rfice import protection to achieve it. These same forces should help drive
the international community toward reducing some of the pernicious trade
effects of regulatory capture as well. The hard question is how best to go
about it.
3. POLICED DECENTRALIZATION AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Short of harmonizing regulatory policy across jurisdictions, the trading com-
munity has many options to address trade frictions that result from regula-
tory heterogeneity. Many of these options are already in place in various
agreements, especially those relating to trade in goods. As I shall argue, these
techniques can eliminate many of the undesirable obstacles to trade that result
from regulatory differences.
Policed decentralization
As noted, 'policed decentralization' refers to a system in which regulators in
different jurisdictions operate independently and may adopt different sub-
stantive regulations, but must do so subject to a number of constraints.
Examples abound. The US federal system embodies a system of policed
decentralization in which states exercise regulatory authority constrained by
the dormant commerce clause and occasionally by federal statute. The
European Union is also such a system, where Member States pursue their
regulatory policies subject to the constraints of the Treaty of Rome as admin-
istered by the European Court of Justice, and to various directives from
Brussels. NAFTA is yet another example, as is the WTO/GATT system -
both constrain the regulatory policies of member nations through agreements
on technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, trade in
services, and other subjects. Reduced to essentials, these systems suggest a
handful of basic principles that reduce the adverse consequences for trade
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of regulatory heterogeneity while still allowing national regulators the free-
dom to pursue different goals or different levels of regulatory stringency. 7
1. Non-discrimination requirements
Among the most basic principles of policed decentralization is the national
treatment principle, which implies as a corollary the most-favored nation
principle. Put simply, national treatment forbids regulators from discrimi-
nating against foreign firms by imposing greater burdens on them than on
domestic firms.
The wisdom of this non-discrimination requirement is obvious. Whatever
the justification for a particular regulation, there can be no justification for
exempting domestic firms from the need to comply. Such favoritism toward
domestic firms instead affords virtually conclusive evidence of capture or
bureaucratic indifference, most probably the former, raising the costs of
foreign suppliers relative to domestic competitors and thus having effects
similar to traditional trade protection.
Equally clearly, however, a non-discrimination requirement falls far short
of eliminating all of the undesirable costs of regulatory heterogeneity in the
trading system. With reference to the typology of costs identified in Section
1, a non-discrimination requirement addresses only one category - added
requirements for foreign firms. Avoidable costs of 'surprise', regulatory
redundancy, loss of scale or input economies, information and confor-
mity assessment may all persist despite national treatment, and thus efforts
to remediate them through policed decentralization require additional
measures.
2. The sham pinciple and the obligation to, give reasons
An additional weapon against undesirable regulatory heterogeneity may be
called the 'sham principle', under which the actions of regulators may be
directly reviewed for improper motive. 'Sham' arises where the purported,
high-minded objectives of regulation are found to be disingenuous and
the real motive is found to be protectionist. The sham principle is related
to non-discrimination principles in that evidence of discrimination is pow-
erful evidence of sham, but it has the potential to reach non-discriminatory
regulations as well when their true objective is to disadvantage foreign
firms.
In an ideal world, the sham principle might police problems of capture
quite effectively. But the world is far from ideal, and the sham principle in
practice embroils dispute resolution authorities in the difficult task of fer-
reting out true motives. Often the motivation behind regulation is unclear,
or it may be mixed - indeed, regulations are invariably the product of many
agents acting together, and it may be the rare case in which they concur
completely on the 'motive'. Further, even where the evidence of sham is
7 An extended review of each of the above-mentioned legal systems may be found in A. 0. Sykes,
above, ch. 4.
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compelling, it can be exceedingly awkward for dispute resoluton authorities
to announce that officials from one of the parties to the dispute have been
disingenuous in defense of their policies. Such a pronounoesent might even
destroy the political equibrium that allowed the introduction of policed
decentralization in the first place. For these seasons, the sham principle may
not be invokld very often in practice, panicularly in systems that lack a pow-
erful central authority to hold them together.
Even f dispute resolution authrities. are trepidatious about involiug the
sham principle, however, a mere requiemtent tht national regulators offer
a public defunse of their policies can be valuable. Embarrasment is a non-
t sanction for bureaucrats who have acted without carefully consider-
ing the implications of their actions or investigating their soundne.33 The
prospect of being forced to off a transprently disingenuous defese in
public may also be enough in some cames to discourage regulators from going
forward with national regulations that result from capture and lack any prin-
cipled justification. Likewise, even if formal sanctions do not materialie in
the end, transparet isiacenty may bring a reputatiomal penalty to nations
that act inappropriately and thus discourage some amount of miconduct
Whatever the limits of the shtam pribile, therefore, thee is much to be
said fur a dispute resolution procedure that obligate nations to give reasons
for their actions, ideally in a public forum.
3. Trenspw&MY vnamu
Transparency requirments include a number of specifics. such as requirc-
ment for notice and com.ent prior to the issuance of new regulations, and
requirements that regulations be published promptly in an accessible fonnL
Such requirments sere a useful function in remediating a number of the
costs identified previously.
Notice requirements directly address the problem of'surprise' costs which,
as noted, may Lead to fall more heavily on foreign fin s. If the notice period
is long enough and if notice is dissemsinued well enougl foreign fins can
undertake new investments and retooling within the same tune fiume as
domestic firms, and will not be disadvantaged by having to exit the market
until their compliance measures are in place or by having to cede scale
econoties to the domestic first-ninuers.
Comument requirements see a somewhat difent functio:, allowing
freign firms to provide regulators with information bearing upon the wis-
doma of their proposed regulations, including infbnatian about the costs of
compliance to Elneigners. Where regulators might create unnecesary trade
barias due to their own limited or mistakbet information, thereftre, the
oppmmity for foreign firms to conneiut may avoid the problem.
Finally, publication requirements reduce die coats to firegn finms of
learning about regulations in foreign markets, ad the costs of unceninty
about the possibility that some regulation may have been ovedookd. It is
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especially helpful here if 6oreipi firms can obtain all pertinent regulatory
informtion from a single 'deuing house' agency or a single publication.
4. Gwuema y requanm u amw zke krn rivu e mea
Many regulatory objecives can be achieved in a variety of ways. The risk of
insolvency for banks can be reduced through increasing the capital cushion
or through reducing the riakiness of the asset portfolio. Food safety can be
promoted through inspections of processing facilities or through testing
of the finished produc. Fire safety can be promoted through chemical
teatment of otherwise flammable maerials or through the use of non-
flammable materials.
Regulaions that insist upon one method to achieve a regulatory objective
when other methods would serve equally well are usuafly undesirable. An
optimal regulatory regime should, among other things. allow regulatory
objectives to be achieved in die leaut-csr fashion. And, when the objective
can be achieved in a variety of ways, firms may well differ as to which method
is die cheapest for them. This is especially liky to be the case in interna-
tional commerce, where tednologies and input prices will vary from coun-
try to country. Regalations that require their objectives to be achieved in
limited ways will thus tend to confer an uneconomic advantage on domes-
tic firms, either because of capture or because regulators draw on familiar
experience as te basis for their regulations.
To combat this tendency, a system of policed decentralization can require
that regulations be drafted at the highest possible level of generality that suf-
fices to meet regulatory goals. More or less equivalently, it can require that
regulators consistealy employ the least restrictive means necessary to achieve
their objectives.
Thus, for camnpfp a regulation govcng fire doors in commercial build-
ings might be drafted to require a certain bu-throgh' ine for every door,
but should not be drafted to require the use of particular materials or part-
Wiar thicknesses where satisfactory petfixinance can be achieved without them.
Similarly, a regulation conceming emissions from automobiles might be drafted
to require that emuissions of particular pollumtm fall below certain lewIs, but
should not be drafted to requite the use of a particular emissions control tech-
nolog, when others are available or may become available. The general prin-
ciple that these examples illustrate is ho product perfbmancc' regulations
should almost always be used in preference to product 'design' regulations.
Similar ideas make sense in service sector. If the goal of a banking
regulation is to protect deposiotm and die monetary systm against con-
sequences of beak insolvency, for ezampIe, regulators ought to look to the
overall riskiness of banking institutions in this regard and not simply to the
narrow question whether some small portion of the portfiblio is invested in
a particular risky asset. With regard to professional licensing, regulators
ought to rely more on general teas of pertinent slkil and knowledge than on
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requirements that professionals attend one of a particular set of accredited
institutions, or that their education encompass a particular curriculum.
Least restrictive means considerations also apply to conformity assessment.
Requirements for testing at a particular laboratory or by a particular method
can surely inflate the costs of conformity assessment unnecessarily. Indeed,
requirements for testing or inspection by nationals of the importing nation,
or on the soil of the importing nation, may well be unnecessary and invite
abuse and capture.
Somewhat more controversially, the least restrictive means principle may
weigh heavily in favor of labeling and disclosure regulation in preference to
other forms of mandatory regulation in many circumstances, particularly
where the regulation is not vital to an important health or safety objective.
For example, many nations have required certain products to conform to
particular designs or recipes to avoid consumer 'confusion' - 'cheese' might
be required to have a certain fat content; 'pasta' might be required to be
made from a particular flour; or 'beer' might be required to contain certain
ingredients.8 Instead, it may well suffice for the label to disclose how a prod-
uct is made, or that it departs from some conventional recipe.
All of these illustrations suggest how generality requirements and the least
restrictive means principle can be particularly helpful in reducing the costs
of regulatory redundancy or of measures to avoid it that sacrifice scale and
input economies. By allowing firms to meet regulatory requirements in the
cheapest way possible and, as a corollary, by recognizing that foreign sup-
pliers of goods and services may already meet regulatory objectives albeit in
a different way than domestic firms, these constraints on regulatory hetero-
geneity can greatly reduce its impact on trade without requiring regulators
to sacrifice any legitimate goal.
5. The role of international standards and standard-setting institutions
A number of international institutions develop and publish product stan-
dards. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has juris-
diction to address design, safety and quality concerns in product markets
across the board, and publishes thousands of standards as a result of its
work. The Codex Alimentarius focuses mainly on food safety issues. A mis-
cellany of other entities with standard setting functions includes the
International Labor Organization, the International Telecommunications
Union, the International Institute on Refrigeration, the International
Commission on Illumination, and others.9 The European Union has its own
'international' bodies as well such as CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. 0
Some movement toward international standards may also be seen in
9 Each of these examples is drawn from a modem case before the European Court of Justice - see
A. 0. Sykes, above, 19-21.
9 Id. at 58-60.
10 Id. at 89.
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service sectors. The recently concluded Basel Accord on bank capital
requirements is illustrative, an accomplishment of negotiations among the
member nations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision."
Typically, these institutions generate standards and guidelines for consid-
eration by member states, with no legal obligation on the part of member
states to rely on them or to implement them (although the Basel Accord is
a notable exception, and European standards can become a 'safe harbor' for
mutual recognition in connection with the modem 'essential requirements'
directives12). Indeed, the standards and guidelines are often designed to assist
private sector activities with no anticipation that they may bear on subjects
of mandatory regulation.
Nevertheless, it is often desirable for regulators to use pertinent interna-
tionally-developed standards in their own national regulations. International
standardization entities facilitate information exchange, and their collective
judgments can avoid some of the errors that may result when national reg-
ulators act on the basis of their own more limited information. International
standards also provide a reasonable set of regulatory options for poorer
nations without resources to undertake their own scientific and regulatory
studies. Finally, because international standard-setting institutions generally
operate under a 'consensus' or super-majority voting requirement, the exis-
tence of an international standard can reflect a high level of agreement about
its acceptability and the absence of a major constituency that would be
disadvantaged by its implementation. Accordingly, unless a pertinent interna-
tional standard is demonstrably inadequate to achieve a particular regulatory
objective, its use will often constitute the least trade-disruptive method of
achieving that goal. A system of policed decentralization can thus avoid
unnecessary costs of regulatory heterogeneity through an obligation to
employ international standards whenever they suffice to achieve the domestic
objective.
Likewise, it is valuable for national regulators to participate actively in
international standard-setting activities, even if those activities do not result
in a standard because of insufficient consensus. At a minimum, high-level
participation by regulators promotes the exchange of information and dis-
courages trade impediments that might otherwise result from inadvertence
or misleading information. International standards organizations can also
serve to pool resources for scientific and technical work, and thereby over-
come free-rider problems that may arise when nations may be tempted to
wait and let other nations fund important scientific and technical studies. 3
1 See generally R. J. Herring & R. E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (Brookings:
1995).
12 A. 0. Sykes, above at 89.
13 In this respect, international standards organizations can facilitate the attainment of what some
have termed 'economies of scale' in regulation. See D. C. Esty, 'Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism', 95 Mich. L Rev. 570, 614-617.
HeinOnline  -- 2 J. Int'l Econ. L. 66 1999
The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization 67
An obligation to support and participate in international standard setting,
therefore, is also a valuable part of a system of policed decentralization.
Mutual recognition, or 'close enough for government work'
The pattern of regulation in the developed world exhibits some remarkable
similarities. Whether the subject is bank solvency, professional licensing, food
safety or auto emissions control, most governments of most developed coun-
tries tend to get involved in regulating, often with similar goals in mind.
Differences in regulatory emphasis and stringency are nevertheless com-
mon, and in many cases justifiable for reasons relating to tastes, incomes or
the other factors discussed earlier. But these differences in emphasis and
stringency may be minor, to the point that goods or services produced in
one jurisdiction will come reasonably close to satisfying the legitimate regu-
latory objectives of another even if not perfectly satisfying those objectives.
When such circumstances arise, it may well make sense for nations to agree
to compromise their regulatory objectives modestly in the interests of avoid-
ing the various trade impediments from regulatory heterogeneity identified
earlier. Thus, although German insurance regulators might prefer that
French insurance companies hold slightly larger reserves, and Japanese meat
inspectors might prefer that American meat packing plants be inspected
slightly more often, the costs of ignoring these differences in judgment may
plausibly be small, and far less than the gains from allowing firms in each
country to export freely without the need to adjust their operations to com-
ply with the importing country's own regulations.
The principles of policed decentralization discussed above will not ensure
this outcome, of course, because by hypothesis the jurisdictions in question
exhibit bona fide differences of opinion over the appropriate regulatory stan-
dards to apply. There is no discrimination, no sham or disingenuous policy,
no consensus on an international standard, and no sense in which regula-
tors are using unduly restrictive means to achieve their goals. Rather, the
problem lies in the fact that the difference of opinion over the appropriate
degree of regulation can impose costs on international commerce (and
domestic consumers) that are out of proportion to the importance of the dif-
ferences in substantive regulation. Under these conditions, the best option
may be for regulators to agree to disagree, while opening their markets to
goods and services that comply with the applicable regulations in their coun-
try of origin. Such a policy may be accompanied in appropriate circum-
stances with disclosure requirements that inform consumers of the differences
between imported and domestic goods and services and allowing them to
make an informed choice of which to buy. Such a policy has come to be
known as 'mutual recognition'. Its great virtue, from a trade standpoint, is
that it more or less exempts foreign suppliers from regulations in the import-
ing country, and the attendant costs of compliance.
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Plainly, mutual recognition is more likely to be attractive where the pre-
existing differences in policy across jurisdictions are modest, and do not
implicate highly sensitive issues. Thus, it is more likely to be attractive
between two countries at a comparable level of development and per capita
income than, for example, between a developed nation and an undeveloped
nation. It is also more likely to be attractive where serious issues of human
health and safety are not in play.
Beyond these rather obvious considerations, it is difficult to articulate any
concrete principle as to when mutual recognition ought be afforded, cer-
tainly not a principle that is susceptible to administration by a third-party
dispute resolution process. Even so, one might expect mutual recognition to
arise by mutual agreement whenever the trade benefit - and thus the polit-
ical pressure for mutual recognition as a market-opening initiative - is great,
and whenever the perceived violence to regulatory objectives - and thus the
political opposition to mutual recognition - is small.
Further, even if it is impossible to write down a general legal rule that will
compel mutual recognition under appropriate circumstances, international
agreements and institutions can nevertheless facilitate it in important ways.
The natural exchange of information that occurs as a result of trade nego-
tiations and participation in international standardization activities can raise
the comfort level of regulators and their constituencies about the conse-
quences of mutual recognition. And, just as the obligation to give reasons
in defense of regulatory policies can discourage indifference, incompetence
and capture in general, so can an obligation to give reasons for refusing
mutual recognition increase the costs to governments of insisting on adher-
ence to the letter of their regulatory policies without good reason.
4. WHAT ROLE FOR REGULATORY HARMONIZATION?
Suppose, counterfactually, that the trading community had faithfully imple-
mented the principles of policed decentralization set forth above in all areas
where trade impediments arise because of regulatory heterogeneity, and had
extended mutual recognition wherever the remaining regulatory differences
were modest enough that the benefits of increased trade seemed to outweigh
the economic or political costs of regulatory compromise. What would remain
to be done to achieve the benefits of a liberal trading order without jeopar-
dizing the ability of nations to take account of legitimate differences between
themselves? The answer, I suggest, is very little.
The principles of policed decentralization would have ensured that
regulatory differences did not arise because of bureaucratic indifference,
inadequate information, or the use of unduly restrictive means to achieve
regulatory goals. Whatever trade barriers remained would then inhere in the
fact that different jurisdictions had chosen to regulate more stringently in
some areas, and had declined to extend mutual recognition.
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To be sure, some of the resistance to mutual recognition might well reflect
capture by politically powerful industry constituencies rather than a sensible
refusal based on the importance of respecting differences in tastes, incomes,
and the like. But harmonization is not the answer to this problem, either as
a practical matter or from a normative perspective. The same interest groups
that block mutual recognition could be expected to block harmonization as
well. Further, to the extent that differences in national regulatory policy had
any foundation in legitimate rather than protectionist considerations, har-
monization would seem inferior to mutual recognition in an ideal world.
This completes the essential argument. As a normative matter, the obser-
vation that regulatory differences are often justifiable on principled grounds
establishes that harmonization is not in general ideal. Rather, the ideal world
is one in which regulatory heterogeneity is limited to those differences which
reflect bona fide differences in tastes, incomes and other miscellaneous fac-
tors. And even then, the costs of heterogeneity to trade must be balanced
against its benefits - sometimes the costs may too great to justify imposing
domestic regulatory policy on foreign suppliers. Fully implemented prin-
ciples of policed decentralization, coupled with mutual recognition where
regulatory differences are more troublesome than they are worth, can in prin-
ciple achieve the ideal objective. Harmonization is unnecessary at best, and
counterproductive at worst.
To these objections to harmonization, one must add that internationally
harmonized regulations are likely to be more rigid than national regulations,
simply because the consensus required to create them may not exist to change
them. They may be more likely to perpetuate a policy that is revealed to be
misguided by subsequent developments, therefore, and less likely to adapt
sensibly to changes in technology.
As a positive matter, these observations provide considerable reason to
doubt that harmonization will often be pursued in the trading community. 14
Although I would not contend that the international community always con-
verges on what is efficient from an economic standpoint (it self-evidently
does not), the fact that most of the unjustifiable trade impediments can be
eliminated without harmonization leads one to doubt that harmonization will
often have much of a political constituency.
I conclude with two caveats. First, there are no doubt a few instances in
which there can be no principled reason for governments to follow different
regulatory policies. When governments become involved with matters of
14 To be sure, Europe has undertaken some efforts at harmonization as defined here under the 'old
approach' to the approximation of national regulations. But successful efforts under the old approach
were few and it was ultimately abandoned in favor of the 'new approach' and its 'essential require-
ments' directives. In the terminology of this paper, the 'new approach' is a blend between the ref-
erence to international standards principle of policed decentralization, and mutual recognition. For
further discussion of the European experience, see A. 0. Sykes, above at 87-92, and sources cited
therein.
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technological compatibility, for example, such as television broadcast for-
mats, it may well be desirable for all nations to embrace the same standard
(although it may not if there is uncertainty as to which standard is best).
Here, international agreement to follow the same policy may be warranted,
and 'harmonization' is useful.
Second, when matters of domestic regulation implicate important cross-
border spillovers (chlorofluorocarbons and the ozone layer, for example), it
is undeniable that international co-operation is desirable to address the
problem. In suggesting that harmonization is not ideal, therefore, I do not
mean to suggest that international co-operation on such matters is counter-
productive, or to deny that co-operation might occasionally result in a uni-
form policy applicable to everyone (such as a ban on CFCs). But that
outcome would simply be another illustration of the above-noted possibility
- in a few cases, it is desirable for every government to follow exactly the
same policy. The limited utility of regulatory harmonization owes precisely
to the fact that this situation is very much the exception rather than the rule.
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